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According to Greek mythology, Prometheus incurred the wrath of Zeus 
by stealing heavenly fire for men. As a result, Prometheus was chained to 
Caucasus with shackles forged by Hephaestus.2 Every day at noon, 
Prometheus saw his liver, which is a symbol of life in many cultures, 
devoured by an eagle sent by Zeus. At night, Prometheus’s liver would 
regenerate, and on the following day his suffering would start anew. His 
plight only came to an end when Hercules set him free. 
In its first few decades of existence, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), like Prometheus, found itself imprisoned not by the shackles of 
Hephaestus but by the excessive use of veto. Because of this 
“imprisonment,” the UNSC was unable to provide mankind with something 
that could have been as valuable as Prometheus’s fire. With more freedom, 
the UNSC could have helped maintain international peace and security in a 
century plagued by conflicts. Instead, the Council remained inert, and wars 
claimed countless human lives. 
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The end of the Cold War set the Council free from the binding power of 
the veto. In the first five decades of the Council’s existence, the veto was 
used 244 times.3 In the following 10 years, the veto was only used on 13 
occasions.4 This new freedom brought forth not only a greater quantity of 
resolutions and actions but also a number of new practices from the UNSC. 
These practices include the extradition of terrorist suspects,5 the 
establishment of international tribunals,6 the creation of a committee to 
demarcate international boundaries,7 the institution of a safe area free from 
any armed attack or any other hostile act,8 the establishment of a military 
flight ban zone,9 and the freezing of funds and other financial assets of 
individuals accused of terrorism.10
If action was expected of the UNSC in the past, then the profusion of 
activities from the Security Council today leads us to the following 
question: is the UNSC subject to any type of legal restraint? As with so 
many other legal issues, this question, although simple, draws complex and 
contradictory answers. Several highly regarded commentators, such as Hans 
Kelsen,11 argue that there are no legal restrictions to the Security Council’s 
powers. In this article, we will hold that the Security Council is subject to 
certain legal limitations. We will seek to expose the myths upon which the 
contrary argument is founded. 
I.  THE MYTH OF THE POLITICAL ORGAN LEGIBUS SOLUTUS
Some scholars argue that because the Security Council is a political 
organ with a distinct modus operandi from juridical organs, such as the 
International Court of Justice, it can ignore international law.12
Kelsen expresses this argument in different terms by holding that the 
Security Council’s resolutions, which are based on Chapter VII of the 
Charter, do not have to conform with the law because “the purpose of the 
enforcement action under Article 39 is not to maintain or restore the law, 
 3. For a detailed breakdown of the United Nations Security Council’s use of veto, 
see Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY 
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
 4. Id.
 5. S.C. Res. 748, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).  
 6. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 7. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
 8. S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
 9. S.C. Res. 781, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9, 1992). 
 10. S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). 
11. See generally Hans KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS (Frederick A. Praeger 5th ed. 1966) (1950). 
 12. Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by 
the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1970). 
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but to maintain or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the 
law.”13
The classification of the Council as a political institution rests upon a 
false dichotomy between “political” and “juridical.” In fact, both national 
and international public organs have components that can be regarded as 
either “juridical” or “political.” A system that classifies institutions as one 
or the other is likely to be artificial and arbitrary. 
More importantly, one must not lose sight of the fact that such organs are 
legally constituted and ruled. In other words, their functions, composition, 
procedures, powers, and limitations are defined by and derived from a legal 
instrument. 
The Security Council was created by the U.N. Charter. Thus, the 
Council’s powers and discretion, although considerable, are based on and 
restricted by this instrument. Accordingly, Mohamed Bedjaoui, the former 
judge of the International Court of Justice, writes, “It is self-evident that an 
organ created by a treaty is subjected to that instrument in its very existence, 
its mission and its power.”14
We return to the aforementioned proposition by noting that the treaty is 
included within a larger set of norms (i.e., the normative order). Thus, in the 
final analysis, all organs created by a treaty (or by other legal instruments), 
including the Security Council, are subject to law. Judge Jennings expounds 
upon this point in the Lockerbie case:  
All discretionary powers of lawful decision-making are necessarily 
derived from the law, and are therefore governed and qualified by the law. 
This must be so if only because the sole authority of such decisions flows 
itself from the law. It is not logically possible to claim to represent the 
power and authority of the law and, at the same time, claim to be above the 
law.15
In other words, the Council is not exempt from the law simply because 
the Council is based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the U.N. Even if the 
Council is struggling for “the maintenance of restoration of peace,” as 
Kelsen puts it, its mission was still given to it by law.  
 13. KELSEN, supra note 11, at 294. 
 14. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 14 (1994). 
 15. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1999 
I.C.J. 105 (June 29). 
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II.  THE MYTH OF THE PROLIX ARTICLE
An analysis of the Charter reveals and delimits, with relative clarity, the 
main powers of the Security Council. Nevertheless, when confronted with 
such limits, those who favor the thesis of the Council legibus solutus 
provide an incoherent reading of the spirit and text of the Charter. 
As the source of obligatoriness for the Council’s decisions, Article 25 of 
the Charter declares that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter.” Thus, there is no obligation for members of the 
United Nations to accept and carry out decisions that are not in accordance
with the Charter.16
However, the authors who believe that the UNSC is legibus solutus 
argue that the text is ambiguous. These writers claim that one cannot know 
if the phrase “in accordance with the present Charter” refers to the 
members’ obligations or to the decisions of the Council.17
Although the wording of Article 25 is imprecise, a fundamental rule of 
interpretation is that no phrases or words are presumed to be useless in legal 
texts.18 This rule is known as the principle of effectiveness and is 
summarized by the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (“That the 
matter may have effect rather than fail”). The principle of effectiveness has 
appeared in decisions produced by the International Court of Justice and its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice,19 commentaries 
 16. See Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute 
Settlement Procedures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 (1994) (stating that “[t]he Council decisions 
are binding only in so far as they are in accordance with the Charter”). See also Eric Suy & 
Nicolas Angelet, Article 25, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR 
ARTICLE 909, 912 (Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet & Mathias Forteau eds., 3d ed. 2005).  
 17. See Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court and 
Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 517, 535 (1999); Gabriel 
Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound 
by Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 549, 555 (1999) (Neth.). 
 18. JOÃO CASTRO MENDES, INTRODUÇÃO AO ESTUDO DO DIREITO 230 (Pedro Ferreira 
1994). 
 19. In the Corfu Channel case (referring to the interpretation of a Special 
Agreement), the Court stated, “It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted 
rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement 
should be devoid of purport or effect.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 
4, 24 (Apr. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf. The Court also 
cites a previous decision from the Permanent Court of International Justice, where the court 
stated, “In case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to 
the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner 
enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate effects.” Free Zones of Upper Savoy and 
District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Order, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_22/68_Zones_franches_Haute_Savoie_et_ 
Pays_de_Gex_Ordonnance_19290819.pdf. In the Corfu Channel case (referring to the 
interpretation a Special Agreement), the Court stated, “It would indeed be incompatible with 
the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring 
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of the International Law Commission (ILC) to the “draft articles on the law 
of treaties,”20as well as in decisions of international trade law panels.21
Furthermore, if the Council makes decisions that are not in accordance 
with the Charter, then the Council will violate the Charter and, 
consequently, the principle of specialty. On this point, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) states, “International organizations are governed by 
the ‘principle of speciality,’ that is to say, they are invested by the States 
which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the 
common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them.”22 In other 
words, any decisions made by the Council that are not in accordance with 
the Charter are ultra vires.
Some commentators argue that if this view was the prevailing 
interpretation, then the member states would be bound only by those 
Security Council (SC) decisions that the member states believed conformed 
with the Charter.23 However, an ICJ advisory opinion shows that a 
resolution adopted by an organ of the United Nations (U.N.) in accordance 
with the organ’s procedural rules is valid.24 That is, although the member 
states must presume that the UNSC’s decisions are valid, the decisions may 
not be deemed invalid a posteriori by, for instance, the ICJ. 
III.  A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES
Article 24 also outlines the important limitations imposed on the Security 
Council by the U.N. Charter. The first part of the Article asserts that 
in a Special Agreement should be devoid of purport or effect.” Corfu Channel (U.K. and N. 
Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 24 (Dec. 19). The Court also cites a previous decision from 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, where the court stated, “In case of doubt, the 
clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not 
involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses 
themselves to have appropriate effects.” Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. 
v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 (Aug. 19). 
 20. Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft
Article on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted 
in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. [hereinafter 
International Law Commission]. It is stated in the commentaries that “[w]hen a treaty is open 
to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have 
appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the 
former interpretation should be adopted.” Id. 
 21. For more information about the application of the principle of effectiveness in 
1947 GATT/WTO panels, see James Cameron & Kevin Gray, Principles of International 
Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001).  
 22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1994 I.C.J 
66, 78 ¶25 (Jul. 8).  
 23. Oosthuizen, supra note 17, at 556. 
 24. Legal Consequences for States of the States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 22, at para. 20 (June 21). 
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“member States confer to the Security Council the main responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. . . .”25
Some authors claim that Article 24 (I) in general and the verb “confer” in 
particular reveal that the Security Council’s authority stems from the U.N. 
members. As the grantors, members have the power to “determine that the 
grantee has exceeded its authority and ultimately to withdraw the authority 
which has been granted.”26 Gill suggests that the word “confer” and its 
consequent “grantor/grantee” relation imply a “superior or hierarchical 
relationship.”27
However, we find that the delimitation of powers referred to in Article 
24 (2) of the Charter, which establishes that “the Security Council shall act 
according to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,” is more 
relevant.28 In the next section, we examine these principles and purposes in 
greater detail. 
IV.  THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE U.N. CHARTER THAT LIMIT 
THE UNSC’S POWERS
In addition to maintaining international peace and security, the U.N. also 
aims to accomplish the following: develop friendly relations based on 
respect for equal rights and the self-determination of peoples; facilitate 
international cooperation in solving economical, social, cultural, and 
humanitarian problems around the world; and promote human rights and the 
fundamental freedoms for all people without discriminating against race, 
sex, language, or religion.29
The principles of the U.N. Charter encompass equality, good faith, the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, the ban of threats, or the use of force and 
non-intervention in internal affairs. Moreover, in Article 2, we find that the 
members are obligated to assist the U.N. and to compel the states that are 
not U.N. members to act in accordance with the principles of the Charter for 
the sake of maintaining international peace and security. 
For some authors, the scope of the Charter’s purposes and principles 
hinders any “tangible constraint.”30 Martenczuk asserts that “the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations as laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Charter are extremely vague and general in nature” and that “the standard of 
 25. U.N. Charter art. 24.  
 26. Terry D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN 
Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 33, 68 (1995). 
 27. Id.
 28. U.N. Charter art. 24. 
 29. U.N. Charter art. 1. 
 30. Matthew Craven, Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions, 13 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 51 (2002). 
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review of the Security Council resolutions cannot be sought in the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations.”31
Such criticism appears to stem from a misunderstanding of the 
principles’ content and functions.32 Because principles are naturally more 
general than rules, principles are less defined and dense by nature.33 This 
latitude allows principles to organize and integrate the other norms in a 
system such that the norms are no longer partial, fragmentary or conjectural 
in nature.34
V.  PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
In the preamble and Article 1(1) of the Charter, the U.N. explicitly 
rejects war and dedicates itself to the preservation of peace. Although the 
preamble affirms that “[w]e the peoples of the United Nations, determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” Article 1(1) describes the 
U.N.’s purpose as the following: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. 
In the Charter, the expression “international security” is always 
accompanied by the word “peace,”35 whereas the word “peace” occasionally 
appears by itself.36 Given the context of the preamble and Articles 1(1), 2 
 31. See Martenczuk, supra note 17, at 537 for the complete text. 
 32. Luis Roberto Barroso stresses the role of principles, especially in a postpositivist 
paradigm: “The acknowledgement of the normativity to the principles and their quality 
distinction in relation to the rules is a symbol of post-positivism. Unlike rules, principles are 
not commands immediately descriptive of specific conduct, but they are like norms that 
cherish determined values or indicate public goals to be attained by different means.” Luis 
Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e constitucionalização do direito, 1 REVISTA DA 
ESCOLA NACIONAL DA MAGISTRATURA, 26, 36 (2006) (Braz.).  
 33. JORGE MIRANDA, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 142 (1995). 
 34. Id.
 35. See U.N. Charter preamble; art. 1, para. 1; art. 2, para. 3, 6; art. 11, para. 1, 3; art. 
12, para. 2; art. 15, para. 1; art. 18, para. 2; art. 23, para. 1; art. 24, para. 1; art. 26; art. 33, 
para. 1; art. 34; art. 37, para. 2; art. 39; art. 42; art. 43, para. 1; art. 47, para. 1; art. 48, para. 
1; art. 51; art. 52, para. 1; art. 54; art. 73; art. 76; art. 84; art. 99; art. 106.  
 36. See e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl. (“live in peace”); art. 1, para. 1 (“avoid threats to 
peace”; “disturbance of peace”); art. 1, para. 2 (“strengthening of universal peace”); art. 1, 
para. 4 (“lovers of peace”); art. 1, para. 39 (“threat to peace, breach of peace”). 
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and 3, one may infer that peace is not limited to the absence of war.37
According to this perspective, peace has a connotation that is close to “the 
construction of peace,” which consists of activities undertaken to assemble 
“the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building upon those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”38 In other 
words, the search for peace necessitates the construction of a more just and 
united international society in which more opportunities for economic and 
cultural advancement exist. 
This interpretation enables us to understand that the Charter struggles not 
only “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom,”39 but also to promote respect for human rights by employing the 
“international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples.”40 Additionally, the Charter aims to resolve 
“international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character”41 and support international “justice.”42
VI.  THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
As articulated in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter, the principle of self-
determination is not only difficult to define but also to apply to real-world 
situations. Baldi avers that “generally, we regard self-determination or self-
decision as the capacity that populations sufficiently defined ethnically and 
culturally possess to coordinate themselves and the right that a people of a 
State has to choose the system of government.”43 Baldi also distinguishes 
between two conflicting notions in the following: 
An international aspect, that consists of the right of a people of not to be 
subject to the sovereignty of another State against their will and to secede 
from a State which they don’t want to be subject to (the right to be 
politically independent) and an aspect of internal order, which consists of 
the right of each people to choose their preferred system of government.44
 37. Rudiger Wolfrum, Article 1, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 39, 40-41 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2002).  
 38. See U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., agenda item 87 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 
2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf. 
The concept used here was the same as that of the Brahimi report with only a slight change. 
We replaced reassemble with assemble. We did so because the concept used in the report 
only referred to post-conflict societies, and we believe that such change makes this concept 
applicable to other societies. See id. 
 39. U.N. Charter pmbl.  
 40. Id.
 41. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.  
 42. See U.N. Charter pmbl.; art. 1, para. 1.  
 43. Carlo Baldi, Antodeterminação, in DICIONÁRIO DE POLÍTICA 70 (Norberto 
Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci & Gianfranco Pasquino eds., UnB 11th ed. 1998) (1983). 
 44. Id.
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As a corollary of the principle of self-determination, neither the Security 
Council nor any other U.N. organ can impose a system of government on a 
population of a State or any other entity.45
The greatest difficulty with interpreting the principle of self-
determination is determining the extent to which we should recognize a 
group’s right to “secede from a State to which it does not want to be subject 
to.”46 Cassese states, “indiscriminately granting the right to [external] self-
determination to all ethnic groups would pose a serious threat to peace and 
bring about the fragmentation of States into a myriad of entities unable to 
survive.”47 Imprudent support for (external) self-determination may 
multiply the number of conflicts, as shown by the case of the former 
Yugoslavia. Regarding this point, a Yugoslav once put it, “Why should I be 
a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?”48 In an 
advisory opinion of great relevance to the study of self-determination and 
secession, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:  
[T]he right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination -- a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, 
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. 
A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes 
the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only 
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.49
To validate a State’s existence and, more importantly, to promote 
international peace and security, the desideratum of the International 
Community cannot be to create a State for each ethnic group but to 
guarantee the rights and the coexistence of all ethnic groups within the same 
State. This task is easier said than done.  
Another relevant issue is the verification of the legitimacy of those who 
evoke the principle of self-determination. In the case of Rhodesia, the 
Security Council did not breach the right to self-determination. Rather, Ian 
 45. Gill, supra note 26, at 75. 
 46. Baldi, supra note 43, at 70. 
 47. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (2001). 
 48. RICHARD HOLBROKE, TO END A WAR 31 (Modern Library 1999) (1998). 
 49. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 126 (Can.). In the 
same decision, the Canadian Supreme Court lists the “cases” that may lead to a “right of 
secession”: “where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is 
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is 
denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part.” The Canadian Court further adds: “In other circumstances, peoples are 
expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.” Id. at 
pmbl.    
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Smith’s minority group did so when it seized power against the will of the 
majority.50
VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH
Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter states, “All Members, in order to ensure 
to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill 
in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
present Charter.”51
At first reading, the demand for good faith appears to refer only to U.N. 
members. However, when we examine the article’s chapeau,52 we notice 
that this demand applies to members not only while they are acting in their 
individual capacities but also while they are acting as members of U.N. 
organs.53
In the advisory opinion entitled “Conditions of Admission of a State to 
membership in the United Nations,” the ICJ recognizes that the principle of 
good faith represents a limitation to the members’ discretion.54 In their 
dissenting votes, Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, and Read 
emphatically state that all U.N. members, under any circumstances 
(including the occasions when they are taking part in the works of U.N. 
organs, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly), have “the 
obligation to act in good faith . . . with the goal of accomplishing the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.”55
The principle of good faith was also included in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.56 The International Law Commission stressed that 
the concept of good faith is applicable to international relations as a whole.57
The ILC specifically noted that  
 50. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER 
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 1, 169-70 (2001). 
 51. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2. 
 52. U.N. Charter art. 2. The chapeau reads: “The Organization and Its Members, in 
pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles.” (emphasis added). 
 53. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 195 (2004). 
 54. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 
4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 63 (May 28). 
55. Id. at 91–92 (joint dissenting opinion). 
 56. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331 (All treaties in force bind the parties and must be fulfilled by them in good 
faith); id. art. 31, para. 1 (A treaty must be interpreted in good faith according the common 
sense attributable to the terms of the treaty in its context and in light of its objective and 
goal); id. arts. 46, 69. 
 57. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 211. The report states, “The 
motif of good faith, it is true, applies throughout international relations; but it has a particular 
2012] Is the Security Council Legibus Solutus? 411
The rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in 
good faith — is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. Its 
importance is underlined by the fact that it is enshrined in the Preamble to 
the Charter of the United Nations. As to the Charter itself, paragraph 2 of 
Article 2 expressly provides that Members are to “fulfill in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”58
Additionally, the ILC asserted that, although some members favored 
stating that a State should “abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the 
object and purpose of the treaty,” the Commission felt that this notion was 
“clearly implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith.”59
Thus, we may infer that the principle of good faith is not only applicable 
to the UNSC but also dictates the Council’s obligation to act in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Additionally, the good faith 
principle demands that the Council avoid adopting any act that may frustrate 
the Charter’s principles and purposes because doing so will breach the 
principle of good faith, indicate an abuse of power (excès de pouvoir), and 
render the act null and void. In the advisory opinion entitled “Certain 
Expenses of the UN,” Judge Gaetano Morelli expounded upon this notion in 
the following:  
It is only in especially serious cases that an act of the Organization could 
be regarded as invalid, and hence an absolute nullity. Examples might be a 
resolution which had not obtained the required majority, or a resolution 
vitiated by a manifest excès de pouvoir (such as, in particular, a resolution 
the subject of which had nothing to do with the purposes of the 
Organization).60
Therefore, the principle of good faith strengthens the demand for 
observance of the Charter’s principles and purposes, whereas the abuse of 
power induces sanctions against manifest transgressions. 
importance in the law of treaties and is indeed reiterated in Article 27 in the context of the 
interpretation of treaties.” Id.
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), 
Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J 151, 223 (July 20) (separate opinion of Judge Morelli). The 
original text in French reads as follows:  
C’est seulement dans les cas d’une gravité particulière qu’un acte de 
l’Organisation pourrait être considéré comme un acte invalide et, par 
conséquent, absolument nul. On pourrait faire l’exemple d’une 
résolution qui n’aurait pas obtenu la majorité requise ou d’une 
résolution entachée d’excès de pouvoir évident (telle, notamment, 
une résolution ayant un objet tout à fait étranger aux buts de 
l’Organisation). 
Id. 
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Additionally, the principle of good faith and its implications are 
demonstrated in the nuclear tests case (Australia v. France). In this case, the 
Court recognized that “one of the basic principles governing the creation 
and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle 
of good faith”61 and that “trust and confidence are inherent in international 
cooperation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is 
becoming increasingly essential.”62 Consequently, in the Court´s view, 
States are obligated to respect the expectations that they create.63
VIII. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Article 1(3) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the U.N. is 
“to promote and to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” 
Other articles in the Charter, especially Articles 55 and 56, and the principle 
of good faith emphasize these concerns about human rights.64
With regard to the issue of human rights, Gill writes, “[B]y acting, the 
Security Council must take into consideration the impact of the sanctions on 
the population of target countries and assure that civilians and military 
observe the rules of human rights in conducting their operations.”65
Nevertheless, some authors reject the notion that Article 1(3) limits the 
UNSC’s actions. For example, Craven claims that a statement such as “the 
Council is obliged to promote the respect for human rights” depends not 
only on one’s perceptions of the relations among the Charter’s objectives 
but also on one’s conception of the content of human rights.66 In the same 
vein, Hans Kelsen argues in the following that the lack of a definition for 
human rights impeded their protection: “[T]he Charter does, in no way, 
specify the rights and freedoms to which it refers. Legal obligations of the 
Members in this respect can be established only by an amendment to the 
Charter or by a convention . . . ratified by the Members.”67
We believe that these objections are groundless. The first issue raised by 
Craven (i.e., one’s perception of the relations among the Charter’s 
objectives) is probably more pertinent to a legal reasoning debate than to 
current discussion. However, Craven’s argument requires additional 
 61. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., 253, 268 (Dec. 20). 
 62. Id.
 63. Id. See also WET, supra note 53, at 197. 
 64. In 1948, Philip Jessup stated: “It is already the law, at least for Members of the 
United Nations, that respect for human dignity and fundamental human right is obligatory. 
The duty is imposed by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, A
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1948).  
 65. Gill, supra note 26, at 78. 
 66. Craven, supra note 30, at 51. 
 67. KELSEN, supra note 11, at 342. 
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considerations. First, in casu, no antinomy68 or incompatibility exists among 
the rules. There is no determination of an objective in one sense (say, 
forbidding something) as opposed to another (say, allowing something). 
Instead, the rules can and must be harmonized in the factual case. This task 
is not a prerogative of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, both domestic and 
international normative texts have rules that need to be harmonized with one 
another in certain factual situations.
With regard to the second objection (i.e., the “absence of specification” 
in the “concept of the content of human rights”), an elementary examination 
of the norms produced under the auspices of the U.N. shows that, in reality, 
the content of human rights is being continually and effectively specified by 
international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
Two statements from the ICJ help clarify this point and reinforce the 
arguments employed in this article. In the following, we reproduce the first 
statement, which appears in a decisum of a dispute involving the United 
States and Iran: “Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and 
to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”69
The other statement appears in the advisory opinion “Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970)” and reads as follows: “To establish instead, and to enforce, 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute 
a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter.”70
An analysis of these statements demonstrates the Court’s understanding 
that the members of the U.N. have a duty to respect human rights because of 
 68. Bobbio explains that an antinomy is a “situation in which two rules exist and one 
of them enforces a conduct whereas the other one forbids it, or one obliges a conduct and the 
other one permits it, or one prohibits a conduct and the other permits it.” BARDO 
FASSBENDER, TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 23 (2006) (report prepared for the 
Council of Europe). Bobbio adds that the rules must belong to the same normative order and 
possess the same validity ambit (i.e., temporal, spatial, personal and material). Id.
 69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 
1980 I.C.J. 42, at § 91 (May 24). 
 70. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 57, ¶ 131 (June 21). 
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the Charter.71 Furthermore, the Court affirms that a connection exists 
between the duty to respect human rights and the “infra-constitutional” 
instrument (i.e., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
The observance of the instruments produced by the Organization, besides 
being an issue of coherence, is a legal duty deriving from the principle of 
good faith. As the U.N. steps up the production and adoption, by its 
Members, of normative texts protective of human rights, it creates an 
expectation as to the respect for such rules by the Organization itself. 72
Moreover, the principle of good faith binds the Member States when they 
take part in organs of the U.N., to comply with the expectations created in 
the ambit of the U.N. which are legally relevant in the field of Human 
Rights. 73
Additionally, the U.N. cannot lecture its members to respect human 
rights and simultaneously fail to observe their behaviors. Doing so would 
signify a transgression of the principle expressed in the maxim venire 
contra factum proprium (“Nobody should act contrarily to and 
inconsistently with his/her own behavior”).74
IX.  JUS COGENS
We find limitations to the UNSC’s power not only in the U.N. Charter 
but also in the imperative norms (i.e., jus cogens). According to the 
definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these norms are 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.75
The basic idea behind the concept of jus cogens is rather simple. Jus
cogens is based on the notion that the freedom that States and organizations 
possess for entering into pacts is limited under international law. Thus, they 
 71. See Egon Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights 
Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 (1972).  
 72. WET, supra note 53, at 200. 
 73. Id.
 74. BARDO FASSBENDER, TARGET SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 23 (2006) (report 
prepared for the Council of Europe). 
 75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 
331. With regard to jus cogens and constitutionalism, Michael Byers stated the following:  
Some of the most obvious examples of constitutional rules in 
international law are rules of jus cogens. Nowhere else in the 
international legal system is the ability of some rules to limit the 
ability of States to develop, maintain or change other rules, or to 
prevent them from violating fundamental rules of international public 
policy, so clear. 
Michael Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 211, 220 (1997). 
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cannot conduct transactions involving certain rules (i.e., jus cogens) because 
these rules are not revocable by an inter partes agreement.76 The 
international community’s collective interest prevails over the individual 
will of a State. 
The notion of jus cogens is largely recognized today by modern legal 
doctrine77 and jurisprudence78 but remains surrounded by doubts and 
controversies.79 Although the Vienna Convention’s definition is the most 
quoted by international doctrine,80 this definition is still criticized in many 
 76. Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM.
J. INT’L L. 55 (1966). 
 77. For a skeptical analysis of jus cogens, see Anthony D’amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a 
Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). The most remarkable rejection of the 
concept of jus cogens is provided by Rosalyn Higgins. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS &
PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 21 (1994).  
 78. References to jus cogens can be found in both the judgments of the ICJ and 
domestic courts. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 20). In the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, the Court cited with approval the IDC’s statement that a ban against the use of 
force would constitute an “example of jus cogens.” See Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). We must note that 
various individual judges of the ICJ mention jus cogens in numerous cases, including ad hoc
Judge Fernandes in the case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. 
India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 135, ¶ 29 (Apr. 12); South West Africa (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 
1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (July 18) (Judge Tanaka) and ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht in Application 
of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 440 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of 
Judge Lauterpacht) [hereinafter Lauterpacht opinion]. All of the decisions and votes are 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited May 15, 
2011). For International Criminal Court decisions regarding the former Yugoslavia that 
mention jus cogens, see e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 520
(Jan. 14, 2000).Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 144, 153–156 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). References to jus cogens can be 
found in both the judgments of the ICJ and domestic courts. See, e.g., North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 20); Az Alkotmànybirosg Hatà 
rosatai, Hungarian Constitutional Court, 1994, in CASSESE, supra note 47, at 428. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
102 (1987) (“Although the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its content is not 
agreed.”). 
 80. For commentators who use the definition of jus cogens given by the Vienna 
Convention on Treaty Law, see for example, MICHAEL AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 1997) (1970); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (6th ed. 2003); MANUEL BECERRA RAMÍREZ,
MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 43 (1991); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL &
HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1990); CASSESE, supra note 47, at 140; 
JOAQUIM DA SILVA CUNHA & MARIA DA ASSUNÇÃO DO VALE PEREIRA, MANUAL DE DIREITO 
INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 347 (Almedina, 2d ed. 2004); EDUARDO JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA,
EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORÂNEO 80 (1980); ANDRÉ GONÇALVES PEREIRA &
FAUSTO QUADROS, MANUAL DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 280 (3d ed. 1997); 
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corners. Jiménez de Aréchaga ponders that the concept of jus cogens is
faulty because it is based on legal effects and not on the intrinsic nature of 
the imperative rule.81 He concludes that “it is not that certain rules are jus 
cogens because they do not permit agreement against them, but that 
contrary agreements are not permitted to certain rules because they possess 
a jus cogens character.”82
Aréchaga points out the greatest difficulty with the jus cogens rule. That 
is, when can a rule be considered jus cogens? To date, no universally 
accepted criterion exists for defining a rule as imperative.83 Consequently, 
L.A. PODESTÁ COSTA & JOSÉ MARIA RUDA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 138 (6th ed. 
1985); NGUYEN QUOC DINH, PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 
PÚBLICO 185 (2d ed. 1999); ANTONIO REMIRO BROTÓNS ET AL., DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
279 (1997); JOSÉ FRANCISCO REZEK, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO: CURSO ELEMENTAR
116 (10th ed. 2005); ROBERTO LUIZ SILVA, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 49 (Del Rey 2d 
ed. 2002); JEAN TOUSCOZ, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 211 (1993); GRIGORII IVANOVICH 
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154–55 (William E. Butler trans., 1974).  
 81. JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, supra note 80, at 81. 
 82. Id.
 83. See Antônio Gómez Robledo, who states that the following:  
The determination of the content of ius cogens, or it used to be said, 
the identification of its rules, is, without a doubt, as Sinclair put it, 
the most controversial aspect of its investigation, its genesis, its 
nature and function. With the exception of a minimum content 
normative core and by all recognized (the hypothesis of school, as 
Rousseau would say), the radiating zone of this core is full of 
uncertainties and in the list of imperative rules made by the authors, 
some with great profusion, the mark of subjectivism is frequently 
seen, and, at any rate, these lists are, as Sztucki said, both impressive 
and confusing. Each author elects this or that rule as imperative rule 
or absolutely inderrogable, for it seems to them that the very 
structure of the international society or the supreme human interest 
hinge on the observance of such rules.  
ANTONIO GOMEZ ROBLEDO, EL JUS COGENS INTERNACIONAL 153 (UNAM 2003). The text in 
Spanish reads as follows:  
La determinación del contenido del ius cogens, o como acostumbra 
también decirse, la identificación de sus normas, es sin duda, como 
dice Sinclair, el aspecto más controvertido (most controversial) de la 
investigación en torno a él, su génesis, su naturaleza, su función. Con 
excepción de un núcleo normativo de contenido mínimo y de todos 
reconocido (las hipótesis de escuela, como diría Rousseau), la zona 
irradiante de este núcleo está llena de incertidumbre, y en las listas 
de normas imperativas que suelen hacer los autores, algunos con 
gran profusión, puede verse a menudo la impronta del subjetivismo, 
y en todo caso estas listas son, como dice Sztucki, tan impresionantes 
como desorientadoras (both impressive and confusing). Cada cual 
erige esta o aquella norma en norma imperativa o absolutamente 
inderogable, por parecerle que de su observancia depende la 
estructura misma de la sociedad internacional o los supremos 
intereses del hombre.  
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controversy accompanies even concrete examples of situations forbidden by 
the imperative rule.  
Because a more profound analysis of jus cogens is beyond the scope of 
this work, we will simply recognize the examples accepted by the majority 
of the members of the International Law Commission (ILC) as peremptory 
rules: the unlawful use of force, genocide, slavery, and piracy.84
Martenczuk argues that the definition of jus cogens is based on Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and that this definition 
cannot be easily grafted into the U.N. Law.85
Nonetheless, we must remember that the International Law 
Commission’s objective is “the promotion of the progressive development 
of international law and its codification.”86 By proposing such a rule, the 
Commission codified (i.e., materialized in a treaty) an already existing rule, 
which can be verified in the commentaries of the ILC to the “draft articles 
on the law of treaties”: “[T]he Commission concluded that in codifying the 
law of treaties it must start from the basis that today there are certain rules
from which States are not competent to derogate at all by a treaty 
arrangement, and which may be changed only by another rule of the same 
character.”87
Thus, the jus cogens rules exist independently and do not depend on the 
Vienna Convention.88 In Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, ad hoc Judge 
Lauterpacht states, “The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept 
superior to both customary international law and treaty.”89 According to this 
opinion, in the case of an antinomy between jus cogens and treaties, UNSC 
Id. Additionally, the following comment found in the draft project of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties conveys the difficulty of defining a criterion: “[T]here is no simple 
criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus 
cogens.” 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 172, 247-48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l.  
 84. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 248.  
 85. Martenczuk, supra note 17, at 545-46. 
 86. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), at Art. 1 (Nov. 
21, 1947), as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 
December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981, 
available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf.
 87. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 247 (emphasis added). 
 88. In the decision Nicaragua v. United States, the Court refers to the consuetudinary 
character of the ban against the use of force in the following:  
A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law 
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be 
found in the fact that it is frequently referred to in statements by 
State representatives as being not only a principle of customary 
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such 
law.  
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 100 (June 27).  
 89. Lauterpacht opinion, supra note 78, at 440. 
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resolutions, consuetudinary rules, or other rules of International Law, the jus 
cogens norm prevails.  
It should be noted that the European Court of First Instance (CFI) also 
took the view that jus cogens is a legal restraint to the powers of the UNSC. 
According to the CFI,  
International law thus permits the inference that there exists one limit to 
the principle that resolutions of the Security Council have binding effect: 
namely, that they must observe the fundamental peremptory provisions of 
jus cogens. If they fail to do so, however improbable that may be, they 
would bind neither the Member States of the United Nations nor, in 
consequence, the Community.90
We note that the topic of jus cogens still exhibits many difficulties both 
for the existing legal doctrine and jurisprudence. However, because the 
existence and normative hierarchical superiority of jus cogens are widely 
recognized, we find that jus cogens indisputably limits the Security 
Council’s power to impose sanctions. 
X.  CUSTOMARY RULES AND ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER
There might be another potential legal limitation to the Security 
Council’s actions in the customary rules. Specifically, Article 103 of the 
U.N. Charter establishes the superiority of the members’ obligations under 
the Charter over an “obligation under any other international agreement.” 
In the Lockerbie case, Francisco Rezek, a former ICJ judge, wondered 
why Article 103 does not “operate to the detriment of customary 
international law and even less so to the detriment of the general principles 
of the law of nations.”91 Rezek states that only the U.N. Charter (not a 
resolution by the UNSC, nor a recommendation by the General Assembly, 
nor a decision made by the ICJ) enjoys the preeminence outlined in Article 
103.
However, we believe that in the event of a conflict between the Charter 
and the customary rules, both the criterion of speciality (lex specialis 
derogat generali) and the criterion of chronology (lex posterior derogat 
priori) shall be applied. With respect to the distinguished judge’s second 
statement, we conclude that Articles 24(1) and 25 of the Charter outlines the 
 90. Judgments of 21 September 2005 in Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission; 
Paragraphs 227 to 231 of Kadi were drawn up in terms identical to those of paragraphs 278 
to 282 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) later 
overruled the decision Court of First Instance. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, 
Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union, 3 C.M.L.R. 41 (2008).
 91. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1998 
I.C.J. 115, 153 (Feb. 27), (separate opinion of Rezek, J.).  
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members’ obligations to execute the UNSC’s decisions that are in 
accordance with the Charter. This obligation may enjoy the preeminence 
conferred by the aforementioned Article 103 as long as the UNSC’s 
decisions are in harmony with the U.N. Charter. 
XI.  IN SUM, THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT LEGIBUS SOLUTUS
After these considerations, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the 
UNSC is subject to legal limitations derived not only from the Charter itself 
but also from jus cogens and other pertinent treaties. The Chamber of 
Appeals of the ICC for the former Yugoslavia also drew this conclusion in 
the Tadic case, as shown by the following:  
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, 
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that 
organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain 
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution 
may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific 
limitations or those which may derive from the internal division of power 
within the Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the 
Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by 
law).92
Therefore, having overcome the myth of Prometheus, we should now 
dispel the myth that an organization created by law can be above it. 
Moreover, the expectations of an acting Security Council are perfectly 
compatible with the notion that men and organizations are subject to the 
law.  
 92. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 28, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
(Oct. 2, 1995). 

